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Abstract: 
 
  This paper sets out to address the issue of equity duration, one of several 
risk measures available for asset and liability management.  Equity duration, as 
derived from the use of traditional dividend discount models, results in extremely 
long duration estimates for equities - often in excess of 50 years for growth 
stocks.  Leibowitz, in his seminal paper (1986), identified an alternative 
framework for assessing equity duration empirically.  This methodology yields 
equity duration measures more consistent with the experience of practitioners, 
implying that equities behave as if they are much shorter duration instruments.   
In our paper, based on an application to UK data, we develop the intuition behind 
the Leibowitz approach to generate equity duration as a by-product of asset 
pricing.  Our analysis suggests that the equity premium puzzle may comprise an 
important element in reconciling the Leibowitz approach to equity duration, with 
the more traditional dividend discount model alternative.  
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1. Introduction: 
 
 Our paper considers an extension of duration, a standard measure of the 
price volatility of a bond as defined in the fixed income literature, to equity securities.  
Fund managers typically use duration in their investment schedules as a method of 
matching fixed income instruments against known contractual liabilities.  Thus 
immunisation, as first recognised by Redington (1952), was defined as “the investment of 
the assets in such a way that the existing business is immune to a general change in the 
rate of interest”.  Immunisation corresponds not only to the matching of assets with the 
present value of liabilities, as formalised by Fisher and Weil (1971), but also to the 
replication of the interest rates sensitivities themselves, as discussed in Bierwag, 
Kaufman and Toevs (1983).  This creates an ostensibly immunised frontier position, or 
fund surplus, against stochastic changes in interest rates, which consequently have no 
effect on final valuation.  Matching liabilities in this manner adds value directly, by 
allowing corporate management to focus on their core business, while simultaneously 
allowing shareholders and future pension recipients to monitor the level of available 
funds more precisely.  International accounting standards enforce a mark-to-market 
convention for pension fund reporting, thereby exacerbating the need for an improved 
methodology for quantifying equity duration risk.  
  In the fixed income literature, Macaulay (1938) first defined what 
subsequently became known as Macaulay duration2, as the weighted average term to 
maturity of the cash flow of a bond.  The weights are simply the present values of each of 
the anticipated cash flows, both coupons and principal, as a percentage of the price of the 
bond.  Macaulay chose each cash flow’s contribution to the total price as its weight, 
which although somewhat arbitrary, remains extremely close to the measure in use today.  
Duration has been subsequently defined by Fabozzi (1997) as “the approximate 
percentage change in the price of a bond or bond portfolio to a 100 basis point (1%) 
change in yields”.  Hence, the concept of duration expresses the amount by which price 
fluctuates with respect to changes in underlying bond yields3.   
                                                          
1 Financial support from the ESRC is gratefully acknowledged. 
2 Independently, Hicks (1939) contemporaneously derived a similar measure to Frederick Macaulay. 
3 Elton and Gruber (1999) identify the mapping between Macaulay’s ‘average maturity’ duration and 
Fabozzi’s ‘elasticity’ duration measures. 
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  This principally depends on the term to maturity and associated coupon 
rate, as well as any embedded options that may be present in more complex fixed income 
instruments.  More generally these combined effects may be captured by a single 
summary measure of duration4, which is the differential of the price yield function.  
Although duration is considered an invaluable tool for gauging the sensitivity of fixed 
income portfolios to movements in underlying interest rates, fund managers essentially 
require the derivation of a similar model for their equity portfolios.  Such a tool could 
then have further application to other asset classes held by pension fund managers, to 
provide for a more complete measure of interest rate risk.  The standard Dividend 
Discount Model (hereinafter referred to as the DDM), as reviewed by Bodie, Kane and 
Marcus (1996), provides extremely long duration estimates for equity securities.  This 
methodology has been criticised by practitioners for its unrealistic treatment of the 
observed pricing elasticity of equity securities with respect to changing discount rates.   
  This problem is particularly acute in the pension industry, where trustees 
are typically faced with very clear liability schedules arising from the nature of defined 
benefit packages on offer.  It is the trustee’s irrefutable responsibility to offset such 
liabilities, and hence duration matching has become a recognised procedure to immunise 
pension assets against interest rate risk.  Thus, the pension industry would particularly 
benefit from a more intuitive theoretical framework within which to match specific 
contractual liabilities against the overall duration of a multi-asset class portfolio.  In the 
absence of a general formula for equity duration, the assets available for stringent 
portfolio dedication need to be restricted to those of the fixed income variety.  Pension 
mandates, however, are characterised by the recent tendency to increase equity 
investment, to underpin the long-term growth in assets as interest rates have fallen, 
leaving the industry vulnerable to the adoption of an unsatisfactory hybrid arrangement of 
partially immunised assets and liability schedules.  The absence of a suitable theoretical 
solution to the problem of quantifying equity investment interest rate exposure has 
become a more urgent issue as global competition for international pension mandates 
intensifies.  Indeed according to UK figures compiled by the Office of National Statistics 
in 2000, equity securities accounted for less than 50% of pension fund assets in 1965, 
rising to represent very nearly 80% by the end of the 20th century.  The issues raised by an 
ageing population, coupled with increased flexibility in western labour markets, has 
exacerbated the requirement for greater equity holdings in the typical pension fund, to 
sustain benefits for an expanding occupational and private pension sector.  Indeed a 
significant fraction of a country’s population now undertakes a variety of jobs over a 
lifetime, so that portability in pension design allowing for disrupted contribution 
schedules is now an essential consideration.  The onus has fallen back on providers to 
maximise the return schedules on defined contribution schemes, exacerbating the reliance 
on the equity component of investment returns.  It is the rapidity and magnitude of these 
combined changes, which are causing trustees to focus attention on better ways of 
measuring asset portfolio sensitivities to macroeconomic changes in the economy.   
                                                          
4  The interested reader is referred to Bierwag (1987) for a discussion of different duration measures. 
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  Because anticipated demographic trends reinforce the need for higher 
levels of funding to ensure sustainability in future pension provision, fund managers have 
adopted increasing equity exposure in ongoing schemes.  Equities are considered well 
suited to long-term investment planning, providing considerable financial growth as well 
as acting as a natural hedge against inflation, as discussed by Bodie (1976).  Indeed, 
equity investment now plays such a dominant role in most funded pension schemes that a 
better theoretical understanding of the behaviour of such instruments is of real economic 
significance.  Any structural mismatch between assets and liabilities will necessarily 
increase the volatility in pension fund earnings, and hence affect the overall future 
pension fund surplus of existing schemes.  Even the historically unfunded UK State 
Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) is tentatively moving towards a more funded 
basis, with the introduction of the new Individual Savings Account (ISA).  The Myners’ 
report into pension reform and the Minimum Funding Requirement places greater 
emphasis on the accountability of trustees for selecting suitable investments in pension 
arrangements.   
  The recent tilt in asset allocation decisions towards more substantial 
emphasis on equity investment has created additional risks among pension fund 
providers.  These issues need to be quantified through a better understanding of equity 
duration, which we proceed to investigate in Section 2.  In this section, we analyse the 
traditional DDM approach to derive a suitable measure of equity duration.  We 
complement this investigation with an examination of an alternative intuitive framework 
for calculating equity duration empirically.  This concept was first proposed by Leibowitz 
(1986) and subsequently considered in relation to the traditional DDM approach by 
Arnott, Hanson, Leibowitz and Sorensen (1989), (herein after referred to as Leibowitz et 
al. (1989)).  The initial Leibowitz model provided equity duration estimates for the stock 
market of around two to six years, whereas the traditional DDM methodology often 
results in much longer equity duration estimates - in excess of fifty years for high growth 
stocks.  The theory behind our asset-pricing model investigating this apparent paradox is 
subsequently derived in Section 3.  It is important to note at this juncture that Johnson 
(1989) has also presented an alternative explanation for this anomaly, in which he 
emphasises that the differences arise from estimating duration from price, as opposed to 
return sensitivity.  Whilst we recognise this important contribution, which examines the 
separate issues of price and reinvestment risk, such an approach does not form an integral 
part of our own analysis.   
  For completeness, however, it ought to be stressed that our paper considers 
equity duration as pertinent to the pension fund management industry, and not to the 
internal asset and liability measurement referred to in the banking literature as ‘equity 
duration’.  In fact, in the two articles by Idol (1997), the term ‘equity duration’ is used, 
erroneously in our view, in reference to the effective asset duration of a bank’s corporate 
assets and internal funding sources.  Simonson (1993) also examined the interest rate 
exposure of a banking institution’s equity capital base, as derived from the duration of its 
aggregate loan and deposit portfolios, to calculate yet another, albeit distinct misnomer, 
once again referred to as ‘equity duration’.   
 4 
  It is important to note that whilst such additional concepts exist in the 
broader literature, they are quite specific and distinct from the definitions we intend to use 
in our asset pricing approach, in modelling the interest rate features of listed equity 
securities.  Our empirical equity duration calculations, based upon an application to UK 
market data, are reported in Section 4.  Additionally we include a further subset of results 
arising from an extension of our work towards resolving an additional practical 
investment consideration, the question of a finite survival horizon for equity securities.  
The real possibility of bankruptcy should undoubtedly play an important part in regard to 
formulating long-term equity investment strategies, as applicable to the pension’s 
industry.  In our subsequent Addendum section, we therefore further explore some of the 
pertinent fiscal and insolvency issues that we consider may be of importance when 
underpinning any reconciliation between the differing equity yields observable across 
global markets.   
  This is an important secondary issue with respect to our main paper, since 
any subsequent empirical calculations for equity duration will be materially influenced by 
divergent yield characteristics and observed corporate failure rates among listed 
companies, across the segmented international investor markets. In Section 5, we 
conclude our article by discussing the further implications of our study and the scope for 
future research, as well as framing our analysis within the context of global portfolio 
management.  The unsatisfactory resolution of the legitimacy of the inclusion of equity 
instruments into what are otherwise ostensibly dedicated pension portfolios, clearly 
merits such further investigation.  The need for higher returns, as pension liabilities 
become more onerous due to demographic effects, have steered investment committees 
towards placing higher contributions into equity holdings.  But this situation appears 
precarious unless supported by a fundamental quantitative assessment of equity portfolio 
behaviour to macroeconomic events.  The traditional DDM literature provides ambiguous 
evidence, given the practical experience of investment managers.  Our work thus aims to 
synthesize an alternative approach, by reconciling the needs of the investment community 
with academic integrity proffered by the traditional DDM approach. 
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2. Alternative Methodologies for Estimating Equity Duration: 
 
 In the academic literature, aside from the traditional DDM approach, there 
have been other proposals for constructing measures of equity duration for use in pension 
management, in particular we focus on the seminal work of Leibowitz (1986).  The 
computation of equity duration in this paper is based upon the observable historic 
correlation between stocks and bonds.  This elegant and intuitive formulation relies upon 
the variance parameters found in conventional asset allocation procedures, and provides 
for considerably shorter equity duration measures than those usually obtained from 
utilising the more orthodox DDM approach.  We will therefore begin our work by 
outlining this methodology, where the correlation between stocks and bonds is used in 
conjunction with a measure of bond market duration to derive an estimate for stock 
market duration.  In combination with the typical portfolio allocation decision between 
stocks and bonds, the beta of the stock component of any given portfolio can readily be 
used to obtain a measure of total portfolio duration to assist in asset and liability 
matching.  This is an appealing intuitive solution to the equity duration problem, 
pertaining to a CAPM style framework.  This requires the estimation of ex ante values for 
the variance of stock market returns, the variance of bond market returns and their 
historic correlation as follows:  
 
 ( ) B
B
E
E DBED  , ρσ
σ




= ,  [Leibowitz (1986), equation (1)].          (1.0). 
 
[Where BD  is the duration of a broad based measure of the bond market, ED is the estimated 
duration for the equity market, Bσ  is the standard deviation of the bond market index returns, 
Eσ is the standard deviation of the equity market returns, and ( )BE,ρ  is the correlation 
between the bond and equity market returns]. 
 
The co-movement of equity returns ER can then be expressed with respect to bond 
returns BR : 
 
ε~)~(~ 1 +−+=− FBFE RRBARR , [Leibowitz (1986), equation (A1)]       (1.1a). 
 
[Where FR  represents the risk-free rate and ε~  represents non-bond market factors affecting 
equity returns, given that ( )ε~ E  = 0 and ( )BRE ~,~ ε = 0]. 
 
  The regression coefficient, relating ED  and BD  in equation (1.0), when 
combined with stock market returns, can thus be expressed as a linear function of δ~ , the 
change in any given long-term benchmark yield5.  
 
εδ ~~ +−= EE DAR  ,    [Leibowitz (1986), equation (2)].         (1.1b). 
                                                          
5 The reader is referred to Appendix A, in Leibowitz (1986), for the complete derivation of his model. 
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 In the Leibowitz paper (1986), δ~  could be specified as any long-term 
benchmark bond index relevant to pension fund management, and thus the model relies 
on the effective duration of the bond market relative to yield shifts in any given 
benchmark.  The final step necessary in combining these intuitive concepts allows for the 
establishment of a direct statistical relationship between the returns on the representative 
equity market index and changes in the representative benchmark yield.  The resulting 
stock market durations are thus simply empirical estimates of actual stock price 
sensitivity to underlying changes in interest rates.  These duration measures are by their 
very nature purely statistical relationships and would be subject to randomness.  
However, they retain econometric credibility in relating stock market returns directly to 
variations in long-term interest rates.  In the follow-up paper, Leibowitz et al. (1989), the 
authors build upon the original conceptual development in Leibowitz (1986) to derive a 
measure of equity duration through price sensitivity to the real and inflationary 
components of nominal interest rates.  We derived our approach by examining the models 
proposed by Leibowitz et al. (1989), which attempt to incorporate the impact of real 
interest rates and inflation within the DDM approach.  Leibowitz et al. (1989) 
reformulates the DDM to obtain a total differential for stock price, or mean adjusted 
DDM duration (hereinafter referred to as DDMD ), as follows: 
 
  dkD  dI 
I 
h 1Ddr 
r 
h 1D
P
 Pd
DDMDDMDDM −≡


∂
∂
+−−


∂
∂
+−−= λγ .6   (1.2). 
 
[Where the nominal discount rate for equities, k, is split into an inflation rate I, and a real 
return r, h is an equity premium, γ represents growth rate sensitivity to real interest rates and 
λ is an inflation flow-through parameter.] 
 
  Although our research is motivated by the concepts within these earlier 
papers, our own analysis differs from this previous work, by incorporating real changes in 
consumption and dividend growth directly into our model, to derive equity duration from 
stock market data as a by-product of asset pricing.  We have re-examined the derivation 
of the earlier equity duration measures, such as the DDM, and instead have chosen to 
combine the variance parameters used in asset allocation decisions, to emphasise the 
importance of the covariance between changes in real consumption and real dividend 
yields, for subsequent portfolio immunisation strategies.  The use of such an approach 
enables us to overcome one of the standard criticisms levelled at the DDM, and cited by 
Hurley and Johnson (1995), that of failing to incorporate within the model realistic 
patterns of future dividend growth.  The appropriateness of the traditional DDM approach 
has been further challenged by the anecdotal evidence presented by the persistent and 
considerable divergence in prospective broker forecasts for individual stocks.  If opinion 
within the brokerage profession is itself divided, when it comes to analysing and 
forecasting the fundamental earnings and dividend growth rates of firms, what useful 
conclusions can fund managers draw?  
                                                          
6 The reader is referred to equation 8 in Leibowitz et al. (1989) for the full derivation of this model. 
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  This highlights a major practical caveat in any application of the DDM, 
since the more complicated task undertaken by fund managers is that of continuously 
reassessing a company’s longer-term performance, which would be confounded by long-
term interest rate volatility itself.  This is often masked by the mechanistic solutions 
provided for equity duration, as inculcated in the traditional DDM, since the value of the 
underlying corporate earnings will be implicitly affected by real changes in aggregate 
consumption.  Leibowitz et al. (1989) modified the traditional DDM techniques at this 
critical stage; by assuming that real interest and inflation rates are in fact the underlying 
variables that “relate changes in the interest rate and the equity risk premium to equity 
duration”.  Their approach re-examined the equity discount rate, dissecting it into a real 
interest rate, an inflation rate and an equity premium component.  
   The verification of such a method of analysis is of critical importance, as 
any immunisation strategy employed against the current liability structure of portfolios 
(where they will inevitably include an equity component) fundamentally relies upon the 
confidence pertaining to the duration values thereby assigned.  Of course, these duration 
measures imply some relationship between duration and the established view of market 
participants in the pension community, as explored for the interested reader in our 
Appendix 3.  By considering equities as part of the financial assets available for pension 
fund investment, we recognise that the composition of a scheme is an individual 
investment decision and thus a utility-based model appears an appropriate foundation.  
Therefore, we adopt a utility framework, wherein the equity risk-premium can be related 
to aggregate consumption.  This in turn implies a link between the equity premium puzzle 
and reconciling the traditionally long duration estimates for equities.  We consider that 
fund managers, as a central tenet of their investment strategy, are continually assessing 
and revising the risk premium for specific companies.  We believe that this is not the 
same concept as purely mean adjusting the level of a constant risk premium term 
structure, as advocated in the Leibowitz et al. (1989) paper.  The majority of the risk 
premium models in finance are single period models of one form or another, and so it is 
natural for us to start from the original single-period DDM approach.  The work of 
Damant and Satchell (1995) will therefore be used as the basis for incorporating the 
important macroeconomic variable of real consumption into the traditional DDM 
framework.  When considering common stocks, we begin by assuming that the mandate 
of the incumbent management team is to maximise shareholders’ wealth in the context of 
the current business-operating environment.   
  This notion is justified by management’s vulnerability to potential 
replacement by shareholders’ votes, cast at the annual general meeting, in accordance 
with pro rata interest in the firm’s equity capital.  However, the dispersed nature of 
individual and even institutional shareholdings may dilute the ready exercise of these 
ultimate powers of administrative veto.  Nonetheless, shareholders’ wealth, or the price of 
a common stock, can be evaluated using the firm’s expected profitability or more 
specifically the discounted expected after-tax cash flows that could be proportionately 
distributed to shareholders as dividend payments:  
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This is the generalised form of Williams’ (1938) seminal dividend discount model: 
 
∑∞
=
+
=
1 )ˆ1(t tt
t
r
DP  ,  (1.4). 
 
 This multi-period model assumes that the future cash flows are known with 
certainty and that the market determined interest rate is non-stochastic and constant over 
all time-periods.  In practical terms, investors are faced with a conundrum as to which 
discount rate to apply across such future investment horizons.  This is due to the continual 
re-shaping and twisting of whatever benchmark yield curve is used.  Such an obvious 
dilemma suggests that perhaps we should be thinking of the problem in terms of an equity 
risk premium, implicit within the discount structure.  In the following generalisation, trˆ  is 
taken as the yield on a risk free bond over the period and Πt can be considered as a per 
unit-time risk premium. 
∑∞
=
Π++
=
1 )ˆ1(t ttt
t
r
DP  , (1.5). 
 
However, the more traditional approach leads us to the following generalised formula: 
 
∑∞
=
+
+
=
1
0 )1(
)1(
t
t
t
k
gDP  ,  (1.6). 
 
This can be rearranged thus: 
)(
)1(0
gk
gDP
−
+
=  ,  (1.7). 
 
And taking logs of equation (1.7) we arrive at:  
 
)ln()1ln(lnln 0 gkgDP −−++= , (1.8). 
 
By differentiating this result, we obtain the standard DDM duration formulation: 
 
( )gkk
P
−
=−=
1
 d
lndDDDM  ,  [Leibowitz et al., equation 4]          (1.9). 
 
    The preceding equation will be recognised as the DDM of Gordon (1962) 
that has been criticised for its lack of practical considerations, most notably the 
assumption that dividend growth is modelled as an infinite geometric progression. 
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3. Calculating Equity Duration from the Rubinstein Model: 
 
  In this paper, we have elected to build upon the more recent work of 
Damant and Satchell (1995) and apply a variation of that work in addressing the classic 
equity duration problem.  This should allow us to circumvent what we consider as the 
underlying practical limitations of the Leibowitz et al. (1989) methodology.  Thus, we are 
able to include an equity premium directly into our revised formula, with our discrete-
time inter-temporal model echoing the earlier work of Rubinstein (1975):  
 
∑∞
= ++
++
+
=
1  , )()1(
)(
i itt
i
itt
ititt
t YEr
YDEP  ,               (2.0). 
 
  While the above equation is extremely general, further assumptions can be 
made such as those presented in Rubinstein (1975) Theorem 2, which imply that the state 
variable tY  is the marginal utility of consumption of the representative agent, i.e. 
)( tt CUY ′= . 
 
Thus we can begin with an equation of the following form: 
 
∑∞
= +
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+
=
1 )()1(
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t
ititt
t YEr
YDEP  ,               (2.1). 
 
As implied in equation (1.5), tr  can be split into a real yield component, defined here as 
k , and an equity premium related to consumption. 
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Thus, by taking logs of  (2.2):   
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YDEP  ,               (2.3). 
 
In addition, by differentiating (2.3), we can now define duration as follows: 
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= ∑  ,             (2.4). 
 
    We will now add an extra set of assumptions, in similar manner to the 
treatment pursued in Damant and Satchell (1995).  Thus, the logs of UK aggregate 
consumption and UK aggregate dividends are defined as being random walks with drift, 
such that they will jointly follow a bivariate random walk with drift.  We further define 
our representative agent to have a power utility function, consisting of the following 
assumption: 
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  By substituting Assumption 1 into equation (2.4), we arrive at the 
following representation, where d represents duration: 
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  Now making the assumption that β = 0, which is the risk neutral case, then 
(2.5) will become: 
t
i
i
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k
DEid ∑∞
=
+
+
+
=
1
1)1(
)(  ,             (2.6). 
 
  By assuming that ititt gDDE )1()( +=+ , where g is the expected growth rate 
in dividends, we can solve for 
)(
)1(
gk
gDP tt
−
+
=  , to find again that ( )gkd −=
1  , as in (1.9). 
 
  More generally however, we need to specify certain assumptions about the 
joint probability density function (pdf) of Dt and Ct, which we will now assume follows a 
bivariate lognormal random walk. 
 
 
Assumption 2: 
dttdt DD εα ++= − )ln()ln( 1 ,             (2a). 
cttct CC εα ++= − )ln( )ln( 1 ,             (2b). 
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

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

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Proposition 1:  
 
    If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then the price of an asset Pt is given by: 
 
     ( ) ( ) φφ ln)1ln(lnln +−+−= kDP tt  ,             (3.1). 
 
where 


−+= cdddd βσσαφ 2
1 exp    , 
 
     Thus, ( )  
1
1
 d
dln t
φ−+=−= kk
Pd ,            (3.2). 
 
  where k  represents real yields, and .1 k+<φ  [Proof: see Appendix 1]. 
 11 
  The above calculations can be considered a form of the Gordon Growth 
Model, where φ  corresponds to the ( )g+1  term, and represents the expected per period 
risk-adjusted relative dividend growth.  Since 0≥β we see that if 0>cdσ , which we 
would expect, an increase in relative risk aversion leads to a decrease in φ  and hence a 
decrease in equity duration.  However, we must be aware of the equity premium puzzle, 
as identified by Mehra and Prescott (1985), which suggests that for power utility, risk 
premia are far too low to explain empirical values.  Alternatively, β needs to be quite 
large to generate appropriate risk premia of the magnitude estimated in mature financial 
markets.  Accordingly, we select to use an alternative linear risk-tolerance utility 
function, the HARA specification, whereby we redefine )( tCU as follows:  
 
 
Assumption 3: 
0  ;  ,0  ;1)()( 1 >>>−−= − tttttt CCCCCCU βββ .7 
 
  Here tC  represents base consumption, or the minimum subsistence level of 
consumption required to provide the necessities in life.  This is analogous to what Marx 
considered the proletariat’s starvation bundle.  We will therefore require a procedure such 
that tC  will always be greater than the tC  subsistence level in all periods.  We need to 
choose tC  in a systematic manner, and so we refer to the earlier work on external-habit 
models by Abel (1990) in formulating a difference approach.  We thus define base 
consumption as an auto-regressive function of tC , such that 1 −= tt CC θ , where values for 
θ are taken from a grid of values where 1 > θ > 0.  This approach is consistent with other 
empirical procedures in the consumption literature as adopted by Constantinides (1990) 
and Sundaresan (1989).  Before we evaluate this model empirically, we should consider 
respecifying the data generating process of tC .  Accordingly, we will assume tC  is 
defined as follows: 
 
 
Assumption 4: 
 
   ( ) ( )∑ +′+′−=− jctcttt tCCCC εα  exp           )( 0 . 
  In addition, ( ) ( )∑ +−− ′+′−=− jctcttt tCCCC εβαβββ  exp)( 0 ,          (3.3). 
where ),0(~ cc
d
ct N σε ′′ , and cdσ will become cdσ ′ . 
 
  Reformulating proposition 1 with Assumptions 3 and 4, we expect cα′  to be 
reduced relative to cα and ccσ ′  to be larger than ccσ .   
                                                          
7 Assumption 3 becomes Assumption 1, and likewise Assumption 4 will become Assumption 2b if 
0=C . 
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Proposition 2: 
  
    If Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, then the net effect of these changes on 
equation (2.9), (3.0) and φ  in particular, is that φ  becomes φ ′ . 
where ]
2
1[ exp cdddd σβσαφ ′−+=′             (3.4). 
         whilst  
1
1
φ ′−+=′ kd              (3.5). 
 
  Thus if cdσ ′  becomes larger for any given β , φ ′  becomes smaller and d ′  
becomes smaller.  The above argument effectively establishes a link between the equity 
premium puzzle and the large values found for equity duration.  Therefore, to reinforce 
this point, we will adopt the following numerical example in our work.  If 
,2=β 04.0=dα (ignoring inflation), 001.0 =ddσ , 002.0=cdσ  and 05.0=k . 
 
 years78
0128.0
1
)0365.0exp(05.1
1       
)004.00005.004.0exp(05.1
1  
≈=
−
=
−+−
=∴ d
 
 
    Thus supposing the average pension fund is invested in 80% equities and 
20% bonds, and further assuming the duration of the diversified bond component would 
be at most 15 years, we can estimate the duration of the average fund’s portfolio.  Hence, 
total portfolio duration equals (0.2) * 15 years + (0.8) * 78 years, or 65.4 years, providing 
for a portfolio duration in excess of the retirement age in many countries.  This would be 
exacerbated in the US market, where typically )( ½    )( UKUS dd αα ≅  is regarded as a fair 
assumption8.  Emphasising the significance of the equity premium puzzle to our previous 
numerical example, if 20=β , which is generally thought to be too large, we might find 
20≈d years, giving equity the same duration as long-term bonds.  We therefore proceed 
to compute    , dcd ασ ′ and ddσ  from our UK data series, to shed light on this anomaly.  
From our empirical analysis of the UK market we may conclude reasonable values for our 
parameters to be taken as k = 4, 4=β  and where θ = 75%.  Hence, according to our 
empirical calculations in Table 2, an average UK pension fund would have a total 
portfolio duration equalling  (0.2) * 15 years + (0.8) * 28.5 years, or 25.8 years. 
  This provides for a total portfolio duration that is consistent with the 
majority of pension funds contractual liabilities.  Our findings therefore reinforce the 
traditional asset allocation decisions of pension fund providers, since the structure of the 
majority of pension schemes appears consistent with suitable matching strategies for their 
underlying assets and liabilities.  This is in contrast to earlier conclusions on 
immunisation using the traditional DDM framework.  
                                                          
8 The divergent yield characteristics across the US and UK markets are considered in more detail in 
our Addendum section, which contains a discussion of dividend payments and related fiscal and 
bankruptcy issues affecting international equity yields.  
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  In the empirical section that follows, we examine the relationship between 
our equity duration estimates and the underlying parameters in allowing for variations in 
θ, β and k.  We obtained dividend and consumption data for the UK market, as specified 
in Section 4.  We are of course conscious of the important role derivatives play in the 
context of global fund management, and thus direct the interested reader to an extension 
of our work to computing equity option duration, as contained in our Appendix 2.  One 
area of empirical research that we have not addressed in our paper is the manner in which 
one might proceed to estimate reasonable values for β  from observable market data.  
Instead, we refer the interested reader to Damant, Hwang and Satchell (2000) for a 
discussion of the obstacles involved in such empirical calculations. 
  Another controversial issue in the area of empirical research concerns the 
average expected lifetime of equity securities.  The traditional DDM approach logically 
implies equities are infinitely lived financial assets in regard to any prospective 
investment horizon, thus generating excessively long equity duration estimates.  This 
stands in contrast to the bond markets, where ultimate available redemption periods are 
generally shorter.  For example, in fixed income markets investors are seldom faced with 
liquid bond issues with maturities in excess of 30 years.  More recently, however, some 
innovative international corporate bond issues have begun to appear with 50 year 
maturities; for example the British Gas 7.25% 1994 issue, redeemable in 2044.  We have 
thus considered whether it is reasonable to treat equities as undated instruments, when in 
fact there is clearly an observable corporate failure rate across all companies in the UK, 
listed and otherwise.  This has been shown to fluctuate with the economic cycle, between 
1% and 2% per quarter, by Joyce and Lomax (1991).  In terms of the pension fund 
industry, investments are predominantly in listed companies, but undoubtedly even the 
most risk-averse blue chip investors are exposed to potential bankruptcy risks.  Former 
FTSE 100 companies have failed spectacularly, as exemplified by Polly Peck, British & 
Commonwealth or Coloroll, and given the volatility in new technology constituents of the 
FTSE 100 in 2000, bankruptcy remains a real issue with respect to pension fund 
portfolios.  Even the most conservative of fund managers will undoubtedly retain some 
real residual exposure to potential insolvency, and so we pose this legitimate concern for 
future research, but present our own initial contribution to the debate.  We therefore 
include a modified form of our equity duration results in table 3, where we adopt an 
estimate of average equity horizon as 100 years – assuming a one percent annual failure 
rate; a binomial distribution implies that this is not unreasonable. 
 
Proposition 3: 
 
   If the life of the average firm is m years, where we consider 100 years as a 
reasonable assessment of average equity life expectancy, we can rework our theorems to 
calculate equity duration for finite-life companies, adjusting equation (2.5) accordingly: 
 
 t
m
i itt
i
itittt P
CEk
CDEi
k
Pd ∑
=
−
+
+
−
++
+
==
1
1 )()1(
)(
 d
lnd  β
β
 ,             (3.6). 
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  We similarly extend our equity duration analysis, by making use of our 
earlier Assumptions 1 and 2, to derive the general conditions for any m-year horizon. 
 
Thus, from our m year survival horizon, ti
im
i
t Pk
iDd 1
1 )1( += +
= ∑ φ ,           (3.7). 
 
Therefore, correspondingly, we also find that: ∑
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Where 


−+= cdddd βσσαφ 2
1 exp   , as before, in equation (3.1), 
 
Now, however, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )mmtt kkmkDP φφφ −+++−+−+−= 1ln1lnln)1ln(ln    ln , 
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We note for convergence k+< 1φ , as m ∞→ , but for finite m, no such condition is required. 
 
  Under Assumption 3, φ  will again become φ′  as in equation (3.4).  
Likewise, substituting this into equation (3.9) will now allow us to recalculate our equity 
duration estimates to be consistent with any given m year average survival horizon for our 
listed equity securities.  Thus, our general formulation could allow pension managers to 
define their own equity duration estimates based on any empirically identified value for 
m.  An indication of the anticipated life span of a company, or portfolio of securities, 
could of course be determined empirically from an examination of the risk premium in 
corporate debt.  The default probabilities, implicit in the pricing of corporate debt 
instruments, would thus provide a useful proxy to the expected time to default.  In any 
event, howsoever our reader may choose to derive an estimate of the expected lifetime of 
listed companies; we provide an efficient method for generating subsequent equity 
duration estimates.  We thus illustrate an application of this approach within our results, 
by including comparative recalculations of the corresponding equity duration parameters 
in Table 3, where we have taken m = 100 years as a plausible illustrative assumption. 
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4. Empirical Estimation of Equity Duration in the UK Stock Market: 
 
  Our empirical work is based on a time series of quarterly data derived from 
ICV Datastream, spanning a 37-year period from 1963 to 1999.  Our market data has 
been generated from returns on the FT-All Share Index, which we have taken as 
representative of the broader UK equity market.  Real yields have been computed from 
UK Treasury bond data, both conventional and index-linked, to provide an empirical 
insight into the historical bounds for real yields.  We also examined the index-linked yield 
gap between gilt issues over the period, which vindicates empirical bounds for k of 
around three to eight percent; see Barr and Campbell (1997).  During 1998 and 1999, 
conventional gilts yielded barely more than 3% over comparable index-linkers.  This 
historically low real yield suggests that investors believe the recently independent Bank 
of England will, over the long run, succeed in maintaining inflation within the 
Government’s self-imposed target range of 2.5%.  Our historical sample period, however, 
has witnessed successive political regimes that consistently failed to achieve anything 
close to this somewhat ambitious target - indeed real rates again almost reached 8% as 
recently as 1990.  These low current yields appear consistent with an overriding 
expectation that the UK will enter the European single currency in the imminent future, 
which may yet allow conventional gilt yields to fall further in line with their European 
counterparts.  Global interest rates for both conventional and index-linked bonds are also 
at historically low levels presently, increasing their vulnerability to any resurgence in 
commodity or wage price inflation, which could provoke a co-ordinated international rate 
rise over the longer term.  
  Building upon the conventional approach in the empirical literature, our 
consumption measure has been derived from non-durable and service industry 
expenditure in the UK.  This implicitly assumes that utility is separable across this form 
of consumption and other sources of utility.  To allow for the non-separability in utility 
over time, we have incorporated a simple adjustment to allow for habit formation, or the 
positive effect of today’s consumption on tomorrow’s marginal utility of consumption.  
Our per capita adjustment factor makes use of the UK population series as compiled by 
the Office of National Statistics (ONS).  We have made use of an implicit price deflator 
series to obtain our inflation measures, and to further adjust our data to reflect our desire 
to work in real terms.  By use of equation (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3), we can derive estimates 
for    , dcd ασ ′ and ddσ  from our UK market data.  We then use our theoretical framework 
to empirically estimate equity duration parameters directly from UK market data, using 
equation (3.5) and (3.9).  The characteristics of our underlying empirical data set are 
summarised by the following Table 1 and accompanying Figure 1: 
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Table 1:   Empirical Datasheet Summary Statistics: 
 
Quarterly Data 1963-99 FT-All Share Yield Inflation Rate FT-All Share 
Real Return 
Mean 0.0466 0.0667 0.0740 
Standard Deviation 0.0128 0.0469 0.2260 
Skewness 1.6774 1.4307 -1.5056 
Kurtosis 9.8439 4.5766 8.8012 
Minimum 0.0239 0.0121 -0.9559 
Maximum 0.1171 0.2205 0.7495 
 
Quarterly Data 1963-99 Real Dividend Growth Real Treasury Yield Real 
Consumption 
Growth 
Mean 0.0137 0.0298 0.0216 
Standard Deviation 0.0614 0.0408 0.0192 
Skewness -0.1766 -0.7824 0.2352 
Kurtosis 2.3589 4.3458 2.7037 
Minimum -0.1390 -0.1069 -0.0188 
Maximum 0.1348 0.1165 0.0677 
 
 
Figure 1: 
 
Real Consumption versus Real Dividends (1963-1999)
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  The preceding illustration of real dividend and real consumption growth in 
Figure 1 highlights the divergence in dividend growth during the 1970s and 1980s.  Real 
dividends fell in response to the ravages of inflation in the 1970s, followed by a period of 
rapid real dividend growth in the 1980s, partly in response to the subsequent market 
reforms introduced under the Thatcher administration.  The graph illustrates that re-based 
real consumption has been far less volatile than dividends, at least from a historical 
perspective.  The dividend series illustrates the impact of the successive dividend control 
regimes applied during the 1970s.  Dividend controls were first introduced as policy 
instruments in the late 1960s and were continuously employed by successive 
governments from December 1972 until July 1979.  The rationale behind imposing curbs 
on dividend payments assumes a degree of stock market inefficiency in the allocation of 
funds, and thereby seeks to increase retained earnings in order to improve the supply of 
organic company financing for future investment opportunities.  An important factor that 
contributed to the longevity of these mechanisms was their inherent consistency with the 
macroeconomic objectives of the day.  These were essentially based on income policies 
that acted as restraints on the rising level of earned incomes, with dividends controls 
tantamount to restraints on unearned income, and thus a natural ideological complement 
towards formulating consistent economic policy.  Here we highlight the implications of 
these controls on our own dividend series, but refer the interested reader to a more 
complete account of these effects as described in Goudie and Hansen (1988).  
  The next section contains our summary results in Tables 2 and 3, calculated 
using equation (3.5) and (3.9) respectively.  In these tables we present empirical results 
for real yields of k = 4%, for both equity duration models, where we have taken m = 100 
years, to illustrate differences between estimates for finite and infinite horizon equity 
securities.  Our comparative static illustrations that appear in Figures 2 through 5 provide 
an additional insight into the effects of changing the parameter values for β, k, θ and m 
respectively.  Clearly cdσ ′  has a pronounced effect on equity duration values, as we vary 
the level of base consumption via changes in θ.  Whatever value the reader may select as 
most appropriate can then be followed through Tables 2 and 3, to illustrate the effects of 
varying β in our example.  Higher real yields have the effect of reducing equity duration 
estimates, as predicted from our theory.  This is readily highlighted in Figure 2, providing 
comparative statics for k.  This is again consistent with findings on the effects of real 
interest-rate changes, as presented in the Leibowitz et al. (1989) paper.  Again in the 
second comparative static illustration, shown in Figure 3, β plays an unambiguous role in 
altering our equity duration estimates.  This further establishes our theoretical link 
between the historically high measures of equity duration attributable to the DDM 
approach, and the underlying equity premium puzzle.  The importance of m is emphasised 
in Figure 4, portraying differences in equity duration estimates obtained from both 
models.  This reveals the practical significance of considering the longevity of listed 
equity securities themselves, by changing values for m, our chosen measure of the 
average life span for equity securities.  Finally, Figure 5 explores changes in θ, and 
thereby the level of base consumption upon our equity duration estimates.   
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Table 2:    FT All Share [1963-98] Equity Duration Estimates for 4% Real Yields 
 
 θ Value σ'CD β = 1 β = 2 β = 3 β = 4 β = 5 β = 6 β = 7 β = 8 β = 9 β = 10 
0.95 0.01282 35.99 26.69 21.25 16.75 13.85 11.83 10.34 9.20 8.29 7.56 
0.90 0.00922 44.85 34.12 27.57 21.99 18.32 15.71 13.77 12.27 11.08 10.10 
0.85 0.00783 49.57 38.26 31.18 25.04 20.95 18.03 15.84 14.14 12.77 11.66 
0.80 0.00708 52.55 40.92 33.54 27.07 22.72 19.59 17.24 15.40 13.92 12.72 
0.75 0.00661 54.60 42.80 35.22 28.52 23.99 20.72 18.25 16.32 14.76 13.49 
0.70 0.00629 56.11 44.18 36.47 29.61 24.95 21.57 19.02 17.01 15.40 14.08 
0.65 0.00606 57.26 45.25 37.43 30.46 25.70 22.24 19.62 17.56 15.90 14.54 
0.60 0.00588 58.17 46.10 38.21 31.14 26.30 22.78 20.11 18.00 16.31 14.91 
0.55 0.00574 58.90 46.79 38.84 31.69 26.79 23.22 20.51 18.37 16.64 15.22 
0.50 0.00563 59.51 47.37 39.36 32.16 27.21 23.59 20.84 18.67 16.92 15.48 
0.45 0.00553 60.02 47.85 39.81 32.55 27.56 23.91 21.13 18.93 17.16 15.70 
0.40 0.00546 60.46 48.26 40.19 32.89 27.86 24.18 21.37 19.16 17.37 15.89 
0.35 0.00539 60.83 48.62 40.52 33.18 28.12 24.41 21.58 19.35 17.55 16.06 
0.30 0.00533 61.16 48.93 40.81 33.44 28.35 24.62 21.77 19.52 17.71 16.21 
0.25 0.00528 61.45 49.21 41.06 33.67 28.55 24.80 21.94 19.68 17.85 16.33 
0.20 0.00524 61.70 49.45 41.29 33.87 28.73 24.96 22.08 19.81 17.97 16.45 
0.15 0.00520 61.93 49.67 41.49 34.05 28.89 25.11 22.22 19.93 18.08 16.55 
0.10 0.00517 62.13 49.87 41.67 34.21 29.04 25.24 22.34 20.04 18.18 16.65 
0.05 0.00513 62.32 50.04 41.84 34.36 29.17 25.36 22.44 20.14 18.27 16.73 
0.00 0.00511 62.48 50.20 41.99 34.49 29.29 25.47 22.54 20.23 18.36 16.81 
 
 
Table 3:  Recalculation of Equity Duration Estimates for m = 100 years and k = 4% 
 
θ Value σ'CD β = 1 β = 2 β = 3 β = 4 β = 5 β = 6 β = 7 β = 8 β = 9 β = 10 
0.95 0.01282 29.12 24.17 20.30 16.48 13.78 11.81 10.33 9.20 8.29 7.56 
0.90 0.00922 32.42 28.27 24.73 20.88 17.88 15.54 13.71 12.25 11.07 10.10 
0.85 0.00783 33.78 30.07 26.79 23.09 20.07 17.63 15.66 14.05 12.73 11.64 
0.80 0.00708 34.54 31.09 27.99 24.42 21.43 18.96 16.93 15.25 13.85 12.68 
0.75 0.00661 35.02 31.75 28.78 25.30 22.35 19.88 17.82 16.09 14.65 13.43 
0.70 0.00629 35.35 32.20 29.33 25.93 23.02 20.56 18.48 16.73 15.25 13.99 
0.65 0.00606 35.60 32.54 29.74 26.40 23.53 21.07 18.98 17.22 15.71 14.44 
0.60 0.00588 35.78 32.80 30.05 26.77 23.92 21.47 19.38 17.60 16.09 14.79 
0.55 0.00574 35.93 33.01 30.30 27.07 24.24 21.80 19.71 17.92 16.39 15.08 
0.50 0.00563 36.05 33.17 30.51 27.31 24.50 22.07 19.98 18.19 16.65 15.32 
0.45 0.00553 36.15 33.31 30.68 27.51 24.72 22.30 20.20 18.41 16.86 15.53 
0.40 0.00546 36.23 33.43 30.82 27.67 24.90 22.49 20.40 18.60 17.05 15.71 
0.35 0.00539 36.30 33.53 30.94 27.82 25.06 22.65 20.56 18.76 17.20 15.86 
0.30 0.00533 36.36 33.61 31.05 27.94 25.20 22.80 20.71 18.90 17.34 15.99 
0.25 0.00528 36.42 33.69 31.14 28.05 25.32 22.92 20.84 19.03 17.47 16.11 
0.20 0.00524 36.46 33.75 31.22 28.15 25.42 23.03 20.95 19.14 17.57 16.22 
0.15 0.00520 36.50 33.81 31.29 28.24 25.52 23.13 21.05 19.24 17.67 16.31 
0.10 0.00517 36.54 33.86 31.36 28.31 25.60 23.22 21.14 19.33 17.76 16.39 
0.05 0.00513 36.57 33.91 31.42 28.38 25.68 23.30 21.22 19.41 17.84 16.47 
0.00 0.00511 36.60 33.95 31.47 28.44 25.75 23.37 21.30 19.49 17.91 16.54 
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Figure 3: 
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Figure 4: 
Comparative Statics for m
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Figure 5: 
Comparative Statics for θ
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5. Conclusions: 
 
   We began our paper by acknowledging a criticism of the traditional 
dividend discount model, which provides for extremely long equity duration estimates, 
often in excess of 50 years for high growth stocks.  Empirical estimates derived from the 
intuitive approach of Leibowitz (1986), which relies on standard regression techniques to 
estimate actual stock price sensitivity, result in duration estimates of between two and six 
years.  Our work provides an alternative methodology to address this apparent paradox, 
and establishes equity duration estimates within these polarised bounds.  We proceeded to 
demonstrate the flexibility in our approach, by considering the impact of corporate failure 
rates on equity duration calculations for the UK equity market.  Listed company failure 
rates can average as high as 1% to 2% per annum in the UK, suggesting that there needs 
to be a reasonable approximation to the average equity survival horizon.  We thus 
calibrated our model to reflect the real investment evidence of equities behaving as more 
finite horizon securities, choosing 100 years as an average lifetime benchmark.  We 
argued that the resultant calculations are consistent with the liability structure of most 
pension funds, which have upper liability durations considerably below the 49-year 
maximum contribution period for a male worker in the UK.  Both average contribution 
and redemption periods across all policyholders are almost certain to be of a considerably 
shorter duration characteristics and our duration estimates suggest a far closer 
correspondence in asset matching. 
  The degree to which pension funds can immunise a multi-asset portfolio 
relies more generally upon the definition of equity duration used, and hence how we 
intend to model total portfolio duration to thereby control a fund’s overall interest rate 
risk.  From our empirical work, we have concluded that a portfolio’s total duration, as a 
measure of its sensitivity to interest rates, may well be substantially different from that 
implied solely by calculating the duration of its fixed income components.  This has 
profound implications for fund managers attempting to implement secure immunisation 
strategies for mixed asset classes, as they may be potentially overlooking a fundamental 
risk factor, that of equity duration.  Inevitably, a significant portion of portfolio risk relies 
on the accuracy of the equity duration measures used, and so our work retains particular 
relevance to the investment community in improving such estimates.  This is paramount 
to the trustee context of overall pension liability frameworks, around which most pension 
funds operate.  The introduction of the minimum funding requirements under the 
Pensions Act 1995, has further increased the need to adopt matched investment strategies 
to prevent cash calls on plan sponsors during downturns in the equity markets.  
  Our paper has relied on UK market dividend data, but we acknowledge its 
application in a global asset management context.  The dividend yield on the UK market 
is dissimilar to that available in other international markets, demonstrably the US and 
Japan.  We consider the demand for dividend payments as well as more fully exploring 
the apparent dissimilarities across investor markets within our Addendum section.  Here 
we draw on the parallels between the UK and the US investor markets, to illustrate how 
differences in dividend yields are influenced by specific fiscal and bankruptcy legislation.  
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  Historically, the central objection to adopting the traditional DDM 
framework as a useful tool for pension and asset management was that it tended to 
provide extremely long measures of equity duration, as distinct from practitioner 
observations.  This suggested, contrary to asset management convention, that the fixed 
income portion of a fund manager’s portfolio might well be used as a means of actually 
shortening the overall duration of the asset pool.  This puzzling result stood in sharp 
contrast to fund management practice, where the equity component of a portfolio tended 
to be thought of at least in terms of representing much shorter durations than those 
implied by traditional DDMs.  We thus set out to derive a new theoretical model, which 
whilst retaining the intuitive appeal of the Leibowitz (1986) methodology, crucially 
maintains the authenticity of the more traditional approach.  Our work allowed us to 
compute more intuitively acceptable values for UK equity duration, consistent with actual 
asset allocation decisions undertaken by the major pension funds.   
  Moreover, our approach provides an inherent consistency with the actuarial 
assessment of equity fund valuation.  This has become increasingly important through 
recent government initiatives to review the pension legislation with reference to the 
Myners committee inquiry recommendations, and the report from the Institute of 
Actuaries.  Pension fund actuaries assess the value of an equity investment portfolio by 
projecting future dividends, based upon long-term real dividend growth and real interest 
rate assumptions, as defined in Griffin (1998).  Our model captures these features 
comprehensively, aligning the risk management tools of pension fund trustees directly 
with the mechanical actuarial assumptions used in monitoring their performance.  We 
therefore anticipate considerable further investigation in this area, involving the 
computation of equity duration by sectors, to allow for portfolio construction and 
subsequent immunisation strategies.  The propensity for additional funded pension 
provision should ensure that this area of research continues to expand in relation to the 
needs of a burgeoning pension fund industry.  Furthermore, the prolific growth in pension 
funds since the 1960s, coupled with the ageing demographic profile in the developed 
world, have eroded the traditional advantages of unfunded pay-as-you-go schemes, 
exacerbating the need to monitor and improve pension fund performance. 
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Appendix 1:  Derivation of the Equity Duration Model 
 
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, it follows that:  
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Using moment generating functions, the right hand side of (2.7), can be calculated so that:  
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Equation (2.7) and (2.8) can be substituted into equation (3.0), thus, we find that: 
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Appendix 2:  Extensions to Compute Option Duration 
 
 
   An advantage of our procedure is that we can apply this directly to pricing 
options consistently with Black and Scholes (1973).  Thus duration can be computed for 
derivatives as well, in similar treatment to Garman (1985), where this can be thought of 
as the usual “Greek”, rho (ρ) with respect to interest rates, where tO  is the option price 
and where tOd ρ= .  Assuming Black and Scholes holds, which we have not shown in 
our paper: 
 
Duration ( )
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ττ ,          (4.1). 
 
  Where x is the exercise price of the call, ( ).Φ is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function τ is the maturity, and d1 and d2 are defined as follows9  
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  That Black and Scholes holds follows from the fact that we can assume that 
the option pays out xPt −+τ  at maturity if xPt >+τ , and pays zero in all other periods. 
  
       Therefore, 
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  The above, under our assumptions, is equivalent to Rubinstein’s model10.  
It is straightforward to extend our option price to Assumptions (3) and (4).  In fact, the 
formula turns out to be the same.  To show the above, we would need to allow a general 
pricing formula to hold for all assets, in particular riskless assets.  This would allow us to 
“endogenise” interest rates and consequently “eliminate” the terms in cdσ  or cdσ ′  from 
our pricing formula.   
                                                          
9 In similar treatment to Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), pp. 352. 
10 As set out in Chapter 5 of Huang and Litzenberger (1988).  
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Appendix 3:  Extensions of the CAPM to Include a Duration Parameter 
 
  In this Appendix, we consider an extension of the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) to incorporate duration, as a general measure of the price volatility of a 
bond or equity.  Duration, as discussed previously, is a widely used measure to quantify 
and control interest rate risk exposure in asset management.  An outline of the theory 
behind deriving an extended CAPM framework, to account for duration explicitly, is 
therefore included within the following section.  Before we begin this endeavour, we 
consider some data issues relating to an empirical verification of any such model.  We 
could initially look to take some 5 years or 60 months (in either weeks or days) of data, 
taking equity and bond indices weighted for the market, for example by 0.8 and 0.2 to 
reflect standard institutional weightings.  Bond data characteristics could then be assumed 
to mimic the behaviour of bullet bonds.  The measure of duration for pure discount bonds, 
in the absence of coupon payments, is equivalent to their term to maturity.  We could 
subsequently specify our set of assets, where i = 1…N, and further assume from the above 
condition that our N assets have a well-defined duration di , (again i = 1....N), mimicking 
the behaviour of zero coupon bonds.  We can then estimate µi - r f , βim and di from 
available data, where µi , rf ,βim and di are defined as the mean return on asset i, the risk 
free rate, the covariance of asset i with the market m, and the duration of asset i 
respectively.   
  The duration measures we derive still of course imply some relationship 
between duration and the established view of market participants, as alluded to in our 
earlier discussion.  Our contribution here is to consider the reformulation of these 
measures to directly test such hypotheses.  Thus, we might aim to rationalise some of the 
clientele effects observed in financial markets, as well as conducting research into the 
underlying reasons behind different institutional requirements for specific target-portfolio 
durations.  The particular desired duration for any individually specified portfolio is likely 
to be either longer or shorter than the duration, ordinarily implied when considering a 
traditional market equilibrium position.  For this to be consistent with market equilibrium, 
we can invoke a separation theorem argument to provide for a duration-based approach to 
asset management.  In examining such evidence empirically, we might necessarily 
discover the institutional clientele effects required for holding differing duration-based 
portfolio positions in an equilibrium framework.  As is usual for such CAPM type 
models, we could then assume a representative agent and define an indirect expected 
utility function V, which is dependent upon expected excess returns, volatility and 
duration, as defined by µm- rf ,σm and dm (where subscript m denotes the market portfolio). 
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Here we have a representative agent with three-fund money separation. 
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Finally, we arrive at, 
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Since at the optimum, 
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We present the above result in equation (5.0) as Theorem 1. 
 
Theorem 1: 
 
  In a representative agent equilibrium, given a one period world with 
returns, duration and volatility defined for each asset, equilibrium expected excess returns 
are linear in covariance iβ , and in duration id , where 1α and 2α are defined in the proof 
accordingly. 
i.e. iimfi dr 21 αβαµ +=− ,  where we let m
m
m σ
σ
µ
α  .
d
d
1 =  and 
m
m
m
m
d
d
d
1.
d
d
2
µ
α =  .11 
   The testable implications of this model concern the signs of 1α  and 2α .  
From the above we expect 01 >α , since 0dd >mm σµ .  However, the sign of 2α is 
ambiguous.  One consideration here is yield curve related, where we might argue that 
02 >α  if the yield curve is upward sloping, but 02 <α  if it is inverted.  So in fact, 
investor’s preferences for any duration component within their portfolios will be related 
to the envisaged shape of the yield curve, as well as their respective investment horizon.  
Of course, should our representative agent be a short-term investor, we might expect 
0dd <mm dµ , but if he were a longer-term investor, we might equally expect 
0dd >mm dµ .  In our example, the representative agent’s utility specification will depend 
upon the expected excess returns, the implied volatility and the duration.  The typical UK 
investor could be thought of as a large pension fund whose liabilities are relatively long-
term.  Thus, we might envisage a preference for assets characterised by longer durations.   
                                                          
11 Given our equation (5.0), this result follows upon substitution and rearrangement. 
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  There is, however, another alternative and more populist literature, 
exemplified by Pickens (1986) that refutes the preceding argument, advocating that 
investors are in fact particularly short-termist in their approach.  For a rigorous academic 
version that adds considerably to this area of debate, as well as providing a useful UK 
interpretation, see Miles (1993) and the related notes appearing in Damant and Satchell 
(1995).  For the details of a parliamentary discussion, which appears to refute itself with 
its own shallowness in the treatment of this important topic, see the available references 
in Hansard12.  For a more journalistic concoction of the same gruel, the reader is referred 
to the arguments presented in Hutton’s books (1996) and (1997).  Irrespective of the 
manner in which our reader may elect to interpret the short-termist claims, as considered 
in any of these sources, our model permits these issues to be addressed objectively, by 
associating them with a value for 2α .  
  In order to extend the equilibrium conditions for our representative agent 
however, we would have to invoke a three-fund separation theorem.  Our theory 
maintains that, cross-sectionally the risk premium will be related to beta as well as the 
duration of the asset relative to the duration of the market.  We can therefore estimate imβ  
from historical market data.  However, the duration of the market md  presents more of a 
problem.  In our three-funds CAPM framework, we would require to know three rates of 
return in order to determine a unique structure.  We would need to know the return on the 
market portfolio, the rate of return on our riskless asset and the rate of return on any 
portfolio with a zero β , conditional upon having an associated non-zero duration. 
 
  If Theorem 1 applies to the entire market, taking ,1  , == mmmi β  and 
mi dd = , will allow for the following expression: 
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Therefore, by equation (5.1), we have arrived at an alternative representation. 
 
 
Corollary 1:   (for i = 1…. m.) 
 
  The empirical consequences of equation (5.1) are that there should be some 
cross-sectional relationship between risk premia, the betas and the relative duration, 
mi dd .  Indeed, the sum of the two coefficients should equal the excess returns and will 
have testable consequences, suitable for empirical investigation. 
                                                          
12 ‘Budget Resolutions and Economic Situation’, Hansard, 7th July 1997, pp.688-690, and the Finance 
Bill, Hansard, 16th July 1997, pp.475-476. 
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Theorem 2: 
 
 Here we now consider what a minimum variance frontier might look like for 
a duration-constrained portfolio.  This analysis is reminiscent of early work by Jean (1971) 
and (1973), as well as Ingersoll (1975).  As before, we have N assets with rates of return r , 
where ) ,(~ Σµr  and the duration of the assets is denoted by d .  Let the constrained 
expected returns be Π  and constrained duration 0d .  Our frontier is the locus of points 
),,( 20 σdΠ  where ∑′= xx2σ  and so we solve the following optimisation problem (where 
e is a vector of ones): 
 ( ))()()1()(  0 3 2 1x ddxxexxxMin −′−Π−′−−′−′∑ λµλλ  . 
 
Differentiating, we see again three-fund separation.  Alternatively, this can be written as, 


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−′′−′∑ )EE(2
1  0xxxMinx λ , 
where matrix)  3 (an E ×n ],,[ de µ=  and )',,1(E 00 dΠ= . 
 
The first order conditions imply that:  
 
for xˆ , the solution becomes λEˆ =Σx  and 0EˆE =′x . 
Therefore, xˆ  = λˆE1−Σ , and λˆ)EE(EˆE 10 +Σ′==′ −x . 
  So 0
11 E)EE(ˆ −−Σ′=λ , and therefore 0111 E)EE( Eˆ −−− Σ′Σ=x . 
 
If we denote (the 3 by 1 matrix) 0
11
321 E)EE()',,(
−−Σ′== θθθθ  ,  
then dex 13
1
2
1
1     ˆ
−−− Σ+Σ+Σ= θµθθ  .    (5.2). 
 
Remarks: 
  It is possible to compute expressions for iθ , by computing the inverse of the 
(3 by 3) matrix 11 )EE( −−Σ′ .  Equation (5.2) shows that the minimum variance portfolio 
satisfies three-fund separation.  As we vary Π  and 0d , we will trace out a minimum 
variance frontier in three dimensions, ( )( )space  ,, dΠσ .  The equation for the efficient 
frontier will thus be given by, 
0
11
0
2 E)EE( E −−Σ′′=σ .   (5.3). 
 
  Equation (5.3) is clearly quadratic in 0 and ,, dΠσ .  Whilst it is valid to 
assume that Πddσ  is positive, it may not necessarily be the case that 0 dd dσ  can be 
signed.  Thus, there is no geometrically determined market portfolio, but rather a region.  
We could extend this analysis by assuming we have two types of fund manager as follows:  
 
 
(i)  Duration neutral, but return-loving investor. 
   (ii) Return neutral, but duration-loving pension fund. 
 
These assumptions would readily allow us to generate the required equilibrium position. 
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Addendum:    US & UK Dividend Payments, Fiscal and Bankruptcy Issues.  
 
   We now embark on a brief discussion of the comparability of our UK study 
to articles that have examined US stock market data.  Although our approach focuses on 
the UK perspective, it is useful to highlight some of the basic differences between the US 
and UK jurisdictions.  This addendum section begins by exploring the academic literature 
concerning the existence of dividend payments.  We then move on to explore some of the 
economic consequences that are reflected in the differing dividend yields observable 
across the US and UK markets.  Our discussion advances two plausible explanations to 
account for differences in the observed equity yields, namely fiscal and bankruptcy 
issues.  In particular, the inclusion of dividends as a factor in our model highlights the 
importance that any discrepancy between the historical yields available in the US and UK 
equity markets would have on our equity duration calculations.   
  An important question in relation to our work is the existence and payment 
of dividends by corporations.  Famously Modigliani and Miller (1958) set forth an 
irrelevance proposition regarding the valuation of the firm and the subsequent payment of 
dividends, using a set of restrictive and simplifying assumptions.  In essence this 
concluded, in valuation terms at least, that owners should be indifferent to receiving 
income or capital gains from an investment.  Black (1976) succinctly put the case that 
dividends present an important economic puzzle, as corporations ought not to pay 
dividends at all.  The explanation for the actual existence of dividends lies in part from 
investors’ differential and unequal tax treatment of capital gains as opposed to income 
and related timing issues.  Tax aside, investors should exhibit indifference to receiving 
dividends or declaring their own ‘dividend’ by a proportional sale.  Transaction costs are 
seldom sufficient in themselves to explain the reluctance on the part of shareholders to 
declare their own dividend.  Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) explored a relaxation of 
one or more of these assumptions to challenge this basic premise.  It may be argued that 
agency costs, as first premised by Jensen and Meckling (1976), present another reason 
that investors still clamour for the payment of a regular dividend stream.  The distrust for 
management in not applying shareholders funds to otherwise oblique personal goals, such 
as corporate jet ownership or political power, suggests a higher risk aversion to 
reinvestment and profit retention.  Behavioural finance has attempted to explain the need 
for dividends on the basis of myopia among investors, who are happy to spend out of 
current income (from earnings, pensions and dividends) but are extremely reluctant - to 
the point of denial - to release even a small portion of their accumulated capital for 
consumption purposes.  To an economist this should be irrelevant, as in relation to net 
worth, there is no difference between consuming income or capital, and as such these 
ought to be perfect substitutes.  Shefrin and Statman (1984) rejected the dividend 
irrelevancy proposition on the grounds that dividends and capital could not be treated as 
perfect substitutes, even in the absence of taxes and transaction costs.  Investors' 
preference for cash dividends is explained by reference to signalling theory, which holds 
that the raising or lowering of dividends provides a glimpse of powerful asymmetric 
management information that is otherwise unavailable to shareholders.  
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  Two alternative explanations have been proffered, the economic theory of 
self-control by Thaler and Shefrin (1981), and the prospect theory of choice under 
uncertainty by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  The former concept is incorporated in a 
theory of individual inter-temporal choice, by modelling the individual as multi-faceted - 
at the same time being both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer.  The resulting 
conflict is seen to be similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a 
firm.  The latter relies on investor segmentation theory, for if the demographic attributes 
of investors preferring high and low dividend payout portfolios can be identified, then the 
theory suggests that some investors would be willing to pay a premium for cash 
dividends, because of self-control motives, the desire to segregate income and capital, or 
the wish to avoid regret.  Behavioural patterns studied by psychologists seem to suggest a 
correspondence to the bequest motive in old age, that helps to explain why observation 
has demonstrated that people dissave much less than ought to be suggested by any simple 
life-cycle model of consumption, as explored by Modigliani (1986).  A considerable 
empirical literature relates to equity pricing around dividend events, see Michaely and 
Vila (1995), which suggests that some investors skim distributions around the ex-
dividend date, to satisfy an apparent need for actual cash payments, see Lasfer (1995). 
   Our contribution to this debate is to suggest that perhaps investors demand 
dividends owing to certain overriding obligations, in the form of opportunity costs that 
might otherwise be passed up, thereby causing them to prefer a regular stream of income.  
A pension fund for example can defray the ongoing cash payments to matured 
policyholders and current annuitants through the application of investment dividend 
receipts distributed throughout the year.  This would necessarily imply a pool of 
companies reporting and declaring dividends spatially across the calendar year to fulfil 
such an implicit need.  Anecdotically at least, this is supported by the observed dispersion 
of ex-dividend dates across listed companies.  Moreover, the private investor may also 
see similar opportunity costs in the market place from ongoing private transactions, which 
without the associated dividend income stream could not be immediately realised.  If 
companies have a specific level of costs associated with their fundraising activities, then 
there is no reason to doubt that private or institutional clients will not face a similar level 
of costs.  This provides a transaction demand for dividends to obtain additional 
incremental investment funds, as a direct proxy for alternative capital raising activities for 
daily operational requirements.  Dividend payments throughout much of the developed 
world are small relative to the capital value of the underlying investment principal.  This 
fact suggests that dividends may be an efficient method for obtaining small ongoing 
parcels of funding for opportunistic reinvestment, debt repayment or day-to-day liability 
matching.  The power of the institutions in terms of the concentration of corporate 
ownership dictates that there must be compelling reasons sustaining progressive dividend 
policies across the investment spectrum.  The segmentation between ‘capital’ and 
‘income’ funds itself demonstrates a real economic imperative to provide dividends to 
some clients in preference to capital accumulation as required by others.  This situation 
might suggest an illusion - pertinent to investors - in any ‘true’ measurement of 
investment fund performance comparing returns on a purely compound basis.  
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  This implies a policy of perpetual reinvestment that appears abstract and 
irrelevant in regard to actual investor requirements.  Corporate capital structures are 
themselves principally determined by the trade-off between the tax deductibility of interest 
payments on debt instruments, and the increased risk and inherent costs associated with 
bankruptcy, as recognised by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and Gordon and Malkiel 
(1981).  This prevents the level of borrowings from increasing indefinitely beyond a certain 
point contrary to the original Modigliani and Miller hypothesis, which includes the 
feasibility of exclusively debt-financed organisational structures that are not ordinarily 
observable.  The appropriate gearing level for any organisation is further influenced by the 
nature of its investment opportunities and expected cash flows, as discussed by Leland 
(1994), which determines an individual firm’s optimum debt to equity ratio.  Bankruptcy 
proceedings in the US and insolvency practices in the UK derive from an economic need to 
reconcile the microeconomic exit condition, of net realisable value exceeding present value, 
with the bankruptcy principle of liabilities exceeding assets.  There is no legal mechanism in 
either jurisdiction to enforce the redistribution of assets of uneconomic firms that are not 
bankrupt, which might otherwise continue indefinitely in the absence of any active market 
for corporate control.  A firm’s management may not accurately ascertain the extent of 
creditor-losses when determining whether or not to file for bankruptcy, so that not all 
inefficient firms end up in bankruptcy per se, while those that do may not necessarily be the 
most inefficient ones.  However, directors are legally obliged to avoid wrongful trading, and 
are expressively prohibited from deliberately causing companies to trade at a loss.   
  In relation to issues of bankruptcy, a risk explicitly included in our model, 
UK insolvency practices tend to accentuate the position of creditors, with the 
overreaching legal objective to facilitate the immediate dissolution of a company to 
maximise creditor recovery rates.  This leaves little scope for welfare considerations, such 
as the impact of liquidation on the wider community.  The US legal system operates a 
more sympathetic underlying philosophy, contrasted by way of Chapter 11 versus 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.  While Chapter 7 remains closer to the UK-style 
insolvency proceedings, the more common Chapter 11 provides a vital economic halfway 
house for insolvent companies, affording several economic advantages, and crucially 
according to Altman (1984), allowing companies’ breathing space for reorganisation over 
an extended period.  Major US airlines have used this as a means to circumvent onerous 
employment contracts, and to renegotiate improved terms with their creditors.  One 
economic consequence of differing bankruptcy legislation could be the reduction of the 
requisite returns on US companies relative to their UK counterparts; although historically 
real returns have been broadly similar at around 8% according to Dimson and Marsh 
(2001).  The more draconian insolvency procedures applicable to ailing UK firms might 
cause equity investors to be short-termist, requiring higher immediate returns and raising 
dividend yields to compensate them for the perceived risks associated with higher 
expected liquidation rates.  Conversely, US Chapter 11 regulations raise serious issues of 
market efficiency in the overprotection of ailing US companies against their creditors, as 
related by Franks and Torous (1989), thereby lowering corresponding dividends and 
(possibly) the cost of capital.   
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  If long-term equilibrium prevails in capital markets and surviving 
organisations maximise profits, equating marginal costs and revenue, goods and services 
will be produced at an efficient minimum cost in the economy.  A variation on Darwin's 
theory of natural selection has already been extended to corporate economics by Winter 
(1964), favouring firms who profit maximise, whilst eliminating other ‘deviant’ species.  
The impact of capital market imperfections on the natural selection mechanism has also 
been recently reviewed by Zingales (1998), to analyse the effect of leverage on survival in 
the US trucking industry surrounding a period of deregulation.  This study was used to 
gauge the extent to which the legal frameworks of the US and UK might engender economic 
efficiency in capital markets by eliminating inefficient firms.  It concluded that differing 
legal systems discourage Pareto-efficient outcomes, and even in the presence of perfect 
managerial insight would have a latent effect on returns in the equity market.   
  Ideologically, a legal system should probably complement an efficient capital 
market, by assisting the eradication of uneconomic concerns, and thereby reallocating scarce 
capital-resources in the most Pareto-efficient way.  White (1989) argues that bankruptcy 
legislation results in the underpayment of outstanding liabilities, with significant 
redistributional effects.  The paramount economic benefits of entering US Chapter 11 
bankruptcy are not only protection from creditors but also other tax advantages that arise 
concurrently.  Any previous tax losses are automatically carried forward, to shield any 
resumption in profits.  Uncovered pension contributions are immediately waived as the US 
Government sponsored Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation automatically subsumes any 
remaining outstanding liabilities.  This acts as a huge incentive for labour-intensive firms to 
enter Chapter 11 and thereby discharge any unfunded pension obligations.  Interest on 
outstanding loans is also waived, so that creditors can no longer compound outstanding 
liabilities, the first step towards debt-forgiveness in the US.  In combination, these factors 
encourage US firms (who would otherwise have failed in the UK) to survive, with the 
fixed costs of their operations drastically reduced as a by-product of US bankruptcy 
proceedings.  Indeed this was typified by US steel company LTV, which successfully 
reduced steel making costs from $460 to $380 per ton, estimated to be some $60 per ton 
below average steel industry costs, simply by filing to reorganise under Chapter 1113.   
  Overall, neither US bankruptcy nor UK insolvency procedures ensure 
purely economically efficient exit.  The law in each jurisdiction is not prescriptive on 
economic issues but essentially procedural, with UK insolvency law lying somewhere 
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 in the US.  In the US, bankruptcy is associated with 
certain subsidies, which add significant friction to the exit condition of inefficient firms, 
hindering the transition of the economy towards long-run efficiency and lowering return 
expectations of shareholders.  In contrast, the UK procedures often eradicate businesses 
that are economically viable but whose capital structure, perhaps by virtue of 
macroeconomic instability, becomes incompatible.  This lends support to the case for an 
independent Bank of England, with an impartial inflation mandate to foster a more stable 
macroeconomic environment for investment.  
                                                          
13 ‘LTV is Healthier Under Chapter 11, But Not Cured’, Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1987, Page 5. 
 33 
   Therefore, we can reasonably expect that the US equity market could yield 
significantly less than the UK, due in part to insolvency issues, which may reduce the risk 
of US equity investment.  Different investor tax treatment regarding income and capital 
gains also alter the return incentives for investors, according to Fama and French (2001), 
resulting in a divergence in dividend yields.  This is exemplified in the UK by another 
major fiscal distortion in respect to the payment of company dividends, the imposition of 
Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT) on all qualifying distributions.  Historically tax-
exempt sections of the investment community, including pension funds, were able to 
reclaim up to 25% tax on the dividends they received from their investments.  This rebate 
represented the tax paid by UK companies in the form of ACT on behalf of all recipients 
of cash dividends and all other qualifying distributions.  ACT paid by companies on 
dividend payments could then be offset against any taxable UK profits.  This caused both 
distortions to investors’ preferences for dividends, from the enhanced return arising out of 
the additional tax credit, and materially influenced corporate distribution policies.  For 
example, firms deriving the majority of their profits from abroad might have insufficient 
taxable UK earnings to offset more than a modest portion of their ACT liabilities on 
dividend distribution.  This may be a residual effect of the earlier dividend controls of the 
1970s, in that it continued to penalise UK companies who imprudently paid out dividends 
to shareholders in excess of their UK earnings.  Secondly, ACT was payable on the date 
of the dividend distribution, whereas corporation tax is collected retrospectively, resulting 
in a significant mismatch between timing and funding, which also affects corporate cash 
flows.  The Revenue regarded this secondary punitive funding burden as an essential pre-
condition to ensure that tax credits, subsequently allotted to individuals and qualifying 
institutions, had already been received.  An alternative company distribution policy to 
mitigate this tax charge was the option to issue script dividends, saving the company 
ACT, but incrementally diluting any non-participating shareholders’ equity interests.   
  From the corporate standpoint, successive years of losses, exacerbated by 
the lengthy recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s, effectively prevented companies 
from offsetting this fiscal burden, making ACT payments virtually irredeemable.  As an 
additional obstacle, the qualifying amount of ACT-offset against mainstream corporation 
tax was itself subject to some important and complicated restrictions.  The offset could be 
no greater than the ACT which would have been paid by the company, had it distributed 
an amount which, together with the ACT imputed on it, equalled the company’s profits 
including any capital gains – full details of these calculations appear in Farrar, Furey and 
Hannigan (1991).  It was therefore quite possible for a company to accumulate unrelieved 
ACT liabilities, despite having surplus taxable profits, in consequence of its distribution 
policy alone.  This is particularly acute in instances where the underlying corporate 
earnings stream is highly cyclical, such as in the construction industry, and the 
corresponding dividend streams paid out by companies have been artificially smoothed.  
From the investor’s standpoint, dividend streams became even more valuable due to the 
additional tax credit, with a smoothed dividend stream even more desirable from the 
perspective of pension fund asset and liability matching, amplified by the rise in 
collective investment vehicles.  
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  The institutional pressure resulted in fluctuating periods of unrelieved ACT 
liabilities for many UK companies.  Managers unwilling to suffer the wrath of investors 
by continually adjusting dividends to reflect actual earnings, instead resorted to creative 
accounting in annual statements, to conceal the implicit ACT penalties incurred.  In 1986, 
the ACT charge was formally tied in with basic rate of tax.  Revenue neutrality ensured 
that, for the basic rate taxpayer at least, there would be no additional tax burden on the 
receipt of ordinary dividends.  To the economist, however, there are noticeable incentives 
for each party, which distort the traditional dividend payment schedule.  High-rate 
taxpayers have an incentive to opt for growth stocks, to reduce their annual income tax 
bill, whilst receiving more of their returns in the form of deferrable capital gains, 
exacerbated by the more recent introduction of capital gains tax (CGT) taper relief.  
Lower rate taxpayers would prefer to receive dividends taxed as income at 20-25%, rather 
than CGT, payable on proceeds in excess of the annual personal allowance, at 40%.  For 
non-taxpayers, the Inland Revenue refunded the applicable tax credits on dividend 
payments through annual tax returns.  These clientele effects were magnified within the 
investment community, since a major slice of the income received by the tax-exempt 
organisations traditionally comprised these attached tax credits.   
  Institutional pressure was thus firmly entrenched against any reductions in 
dividend streams during recessions, vindicating political concerns of insufficient profit 
retention within UK companies.  Hence, the motivation behind the recently phased 
abolition of the ACT credit and the corresponding introduction of taper relief, as a 
political prerequisite to enhance long-term domestic equity investment.  This has already 
prompted a fall in the average UK dividend yield, which has become more aligned 
towards US levels.  The abolition of ACT also provides an inducement to return cash 
directly to shareholders via share buy-backs rather than through dividend payments, as 
interest on company borrowing is tax deductible, see Talmor and Titman (1990).  This 
affects the optimal corporate gearing level, as debt can be increased to finance the 
repurchase of a company’s own shares, which is earnings enhancing as well as providing 
a fairer mechanism for returning value to stockholders, see Miller (1986).  We have 
already seen a reduction in the number of companies offering script dividend alternatives, 
as well as a corresponding rise in the number of share buy-back programmes.  If this 
trend continues in the UK, investors may be faced with an overall reduction in the total 
outstanding equity in issue by around 2% or 3% per annum.  This could reduce UK 
investment opportunities, although the recent boom in technology, media and telecom 
companies coupled with an explosion in initial public offerings in these areas have 
probably more than compensated for any physical reductions in outstanding ‘old 
economy’ equity.  Increased globalisation across the asset management community may 
lead to further financial innovation, taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities existing 
between separate legal and fiscal jurisdictions.  In the future therefore, we would expect 
to see progressive co-ordination between international jurisdictions aimed at the 
harmonisation of both the legal and tax consequences of global fund management, 
leading to a gradual convergence in global equity market yields. 
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